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Abstract
The growing prevalence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) brings great potential
for public benefit, but in order to fly in civil airspace UAVs must avoid traffic without
the benefit of an onboard human. Developing this capability presents many system
integration challenges.
This report examines the integration of automated detect, see, and avoid (DSA)
systems on aircraft. For context, the need for UAV operations is reviewed. The report
then examines how DSA fits into the entire framework for aviation safety. The research,
test results, and conclusions that follow provide the necessary information to decide:
•
•
•

how to test and evaluate new DSA technology;
what is the necessary performance for installed DSA systems;
what is currently available and what possibilities are in development.

Finally, after surveying available technologies, recommendations are given for
some specific UAV platforms and missions.
This report would be useful for persons engaged in DSA development, acquisition,
or testing. It is applicable for all small aircraft because future advances may make DSA
technology feasible for the entire aviation community. The emphasis, however, is on
enabling safe UAV operation world-wide.
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Introduction
Numerous aviation accident investigations have concluded that unaided pilots are
not capable of satisfactorily avoiding each other in today’s airspace;1 therefore, computer
assistance in the form of collision avoidance systems are now mandatory on all
commercial aircraft.2 Whether desired or not, computers are very good at helping
humans avoid one another. Though the human without the computer may be insufficient,
currently the reverse is also true.
The growing prevalence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)* brings great
potential for public benefit, but in order to fly in civil airspace† UAVs will require the
ability to detect, see, and avoid (DSA)‡ traffic without the benefit of an onboard human.
Doing this presents many system integration challenges unique to typical UAV platforms.
While there is a very large variety of UAV platforms, most are designed for operations at
relatively low speed, low maneuverability, and medium altitude. They are frequently
propeller (or rotor) driven with light payloads.
This report examines the integration of DSA systems on such aircraft. The
research, test results, and conclusions provide the necessary information to decide:

•
•
•

how to test and evaluate new DSA technology;
what is the necessary performance for installed DSA systems;
what is currently available and what possibilities are in development.

Section 1 examines the motivation for these efforts with a brief look at current and
proposed UAV applications needing access to controlled airspace. Section 2 discusses
the four layers of traffic safety and current issues that affect DSA system development.

Discussion of Terms:
*

Some sources use the alternate terms: remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), remotely piloted aircraft (RPA),
remotely operated aircraft (ROA), or uninhabited aerial vehicles. In Europe, acronyms for terms translated
as “aircraft not crewed” are normal. There is no universal agreement. In this report, the term UAV will be
used throughout to mean any airborne vehicle that does not have a human being onboard.

†

Civil airspace is used to define that airspace under the control of the civil aviation authority of a particular
country, sometimes called the national airspace system (NAS), as compared to restricted or special use
airspace. NASA has undertaken a similar project called Access 5. Eurocontrol has undertaken a similar
project called UAV Safety Issues for Civil Operations (USICO).

‡

Some sources use the alternate terms: sense-and-avoid (SAA), non-cooperative collision avoidance, or
autonomous avoidance systems. “See-and-avoid” is the primary term used in regulatory sources. In this
report the term DSA will be used throughout to mean any concept or system in effect for the primary
purpose of preventing collisions between aircraft that have not been deconflicted by other means.

1

Section 3 proposes a complete list of evaluation topics for DSA systems. These are
defined in quantifiable terms so that they are useful for requirements documentation and
test plan generation. In Section 4 an assessment of the necessary performance for DSA
systems is presented and justified. This is recommended as guidance for the creation of
threshold and objective criteria. Section 5 is an evaluation of the current state of the art§
and Section 6 provides some recommendations based on platform type and the necessary
requirements presented in Section 4.

§

The mention of specific companies or products in this report is for illustrative purposes only and does not
constitute an endorsement by the author.
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1. Background
A review of current and potential UAV applications reveals how important it is to
overcome the challenges that currently prevent routine flight operations.

1.1. Demand for UAVs in Civil Airspace
UAVs offer the possibility of operating: for very long periods, at very high
altitudes, doing tasks too tedious or repetitive for humans, in environments deemed too
dangerous for humans, at a significant cost savings to piloted aircraft or satellites based
systems. However, in the same way their autonomous operation makes them very useful,
it makes them controversial. Some see them as an unwarranted safety risk. This section
is not an attempt to win over critics but to define the public benefit of such operations as
a reference when evaluating DSA options. The following missions are the end goals to
keep in mind when weighing complex trade offs. If an option makes UAV flight possible
but too restricted for the following missions, then it is not a true solution.
1.1.1. Commercial Applications
The most visible and direct public benefit will be commercial applications. Already
some UAVs, such as the Rmax in Japan, are being used in agricultural applications.
Plantations in Hawaii have also used UAVs in the same way. Other services that may
one day be the work of UAVs include: telecommunications, television and radio
broadcasting, real time news reporting, and aerial photography. In addition many private
companies will be able to make use of the inexpensive flight time for applications such
as: urban planning, exploration, surveying, and remote area security/safety.
1.1.2. Civil/Government Applications
The low cost eye-in-the-sky capability promises to increase security and assist
government agencies through applications such as: border patrol, counter narcotics,
counter terrorism, traffic management, surveillance of infrastructure (pipelines, airports,
railways, roads, waterways, etc.), communications relays, and airborne crime
reconnaissance. One current example is SIVA (Figure 1). The Spanish government
plans to expand the use of these small inexpensive UAVs for many civil and government
applications including search and rescue and forest fire patrol.3 In addition UAVs can
contribute to fishing regulation enforcement, animal and environmental monitoring, and
atmospheric research.
One specific example of future possibilities is the Altair (Figure 2) made by General
Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. It is a civilian derivative of the Predator B now in
operation for the military. The company hopes it will be the first UAV to meet all
requirements for routine operation in the national airspace. In addition to redundant
avionics and flight control systems, Altair has a traffic collision avoidance system and an
air traffic control voice relay. The relay allows air-traffic controllers to talk to groundbased Altair pilots through the aircraft.4
3

Figure 2: Altair (USA)
(Source: GA-ASI website,
Permission granted)

Figure 1: SIVA (Spain)
(Source: INTA website,
Permission granted)

1.1.3. Military Applications Requiring Civil Airspace
The militaries of many nations are currently using, and expanding the use of, a
plethora of unmanned vehicles on land, sea, air, and space.5 New UAV platforms are
expected to grow at an even more accelerated rate in the next few decades.6
Though their wartime operations are much different, these UAVs still have a
requirement to integrate into civil airspace for transit and training. Some combat aircraft
already possess airborne surveillance systems of some type. This precludes the need for
a separate system to be installed just for DSA, but it will require some modification.
There may be problems with getting approval for civilian use without compromising the
classification of the military application. Also, there are multiple examples in the piloted
aircraft world where the lack of accommodation to civil aviation requirements has created
tension and safety concerns for military aircraft (e.g. F-15s equipped with UHF-only
radios). Also, in keeping with the new mandates on technology insertion, rather than new
technology development, many military programs will likely be pressed to pursue
commercial off the shelf options. For all these reasons, any attempt to create militaryspecific DSA requirements or specialized systems should only be done after a complete
analysis of alternatives.
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2. Layers of Safety
The true solution for safer, and more accessible, skies will be a composite solution
consisting of technical advancements and procedural changes that accommodate new
technology. As mentioned, this report examines the total framework of air safety. By
design, there are four layers that maintain safe operations in aviation. They are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Administrative
Air traffic service (ATS)
Cooperative avoidance systems
Detect, see and avoid (DSA)

Individual aircraft development programs do not have influence over the first two
layers, but program managers should be mindful of how new policies will influence the
performance requirements of their specific program. Technical changes at any level must
be accommodated by regulatory changes to be effective, and those changes need to be
global to be truly successful. The proposed evolution of air traffic control into air traffic
management would effectively swap roles between layers 2 and 3 as the ground-based
staff move away from active control and the networked aircraft perform more automated
route deconfliction. Such is the concept called “Free Flight”.

2.1. Administrative
The administration of air transportation is the primary method for maintaining the
safe and orderly flow of air traffic. This is done by regulating the airspace, air
operations, and certification of new systems. Compared to other layers, it is low tech and
low cost. Wise changes here save money and reduce demand on all lower levels.
However, this layer is neither dynamic (except in the case of NOTAMs) nor flexible.
Most nations have their own agencies to govern air traffic in the airspace they
control. These agencies have the authority to enforce the regulations adopted by their
respective governments. Table 1 lists the agencies and governing documents for areas
with high levels of UAV activity.

Table 1: Chart of Regulatory Agencies and Documents World-wide
Country
Australia
Europe
(34 Member
States)

Organization
Civilian Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)
European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA),
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)
Joint Aviation Authority (JAA)

Israel

Civil Aviation Administration of Israel
(CAAI)
United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
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Regulation
Civil Aviation Legislation
European Organization for the Safety of
Air Navigation (Eurocontrol),
European Organization for Civil Aviation
Equipment (EUROCAE)
Israeli Air Navigation Regulations
(ANR)
Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR)

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations agency,
works to harmonize air regulations world-wide through the creation of Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs). Nations that have agreed to follow the Convention on
International Civil Aviation are called contracting states. Almost all controlled airspace
in the world falls under the jurisdiction of one of the 188 current contracting states.
SARPs consist of two parts: A standard is the specification of anything that is
necessary to be uniformly applied for safe and orderly international air navigation.
Contracting states are to comply with such standards or notify ICAO why they are
unable. A recommended practice is the specification of anything that is desired to be
uniformly applied for the safe and orderly international air navigation. Contracting states
are to endeavor to conform and are invited to inform ICAO of non-compliance. Where
needed, Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) are created to amplify SARPs.
Under the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program, ICAO performs regular
mandatory audits to verify safe implementation of all SARPs. Contracting states that
chose to not comply with SARPs and PANS are to publish their differences in the
Aeronautical Information Publications (AIP). Also, regional supplementary procedures
(SUPPs) can be made that have authority for only a particular area.7
UAVs currently have to perform the complete coordination process of each country
for any airspace they fly through.8 An ICAO-sponsored standard regarding UAV
operations would not only make flight planning much easier, but it would increase
aviation safety by creating consistent procedures world-wide.
2.1.1. Airspace
One of the primary ways that the before mentioned agencies aid in conflict
avoidance is by defining airspace. Table 2 explains the internationally designated
airspace categories. Pilots are required to practice see-and-avoid at all times, but the
responsibility for conflict avoidance changes with the type of airspace.9 In addition, there
is a speed limitation of 250 knots below 10,000´ MSL and 200 knots in Classes C & D.
In theory this makes a very straightforward classification of the area above land;
however, due to factors ranging from the geographical to political, the actual
implementation of airspace is not so straightforward. The airspace over the European
continent is quite fragmented.
The ECAC is pursuing a more simplified airspace allocation plan called the Single
European Sky proposal. In this proposal, ECAC introduces their plan for creating a
Corresponding Traffic Environment which redefins the existing airspace into only three
types of airspace by 201010. The types are defined as:
N: Intended Traffic Environment. All traffic position and intentions known to ATS
K: Known Traffic Environment. All traffic position known to ATS.
U: Unknown traffic Environment. Not all traffic is known to ATS.
6

Table 2: ICAO Airspace Designations and UAV Operations
(Source: ICAO Annex 11, Appendix 4)
Class
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

Com.
ATC equipment &
services Provided
Required
IFR only
Radar
Yes
Conflict resolution &
separation
IFR/VFR
Radar
Yes
By
Conflict resolution &
permission
separation
IFR/VFR
Radar
Yes
After contact
Separation (IFR), or
traffic advisories (VFR)
IFR/VFR
Tower
Yes
After contact
Separation (IFR)
IFR/VFR
Yes
Separation (IFR)
No
IFR/VFR
Traffic advisories (IFR) (<10,000´)
VFR
None
No
(<10,000´)
Flight Ops

Transponder
Required
Yes

UAV integration
problems
None
ACAS, data link primary

Yes

Moderate problem due to
high traffic density,
ACAS, data link primary
Possible problem due to
high traffic density,
ACAS, data link primary
ACAS insufficient,
DSA system primary
ACAS insufficient,
DSA system primary
ACAS insufficient,
DSA system primary
Moderate problem due to
lack of ATC coverage,
DSA system primary

Yes
No
No (<10,000´)
No (<10,000´)
No (<10,000´)

Figure 3 illustrates the lack of standardization in European airspace. In anticipation
of the migration from that to the Single European Sky proposal shown in Figure 4,
European countries have implemented new requirements. Mode S capable transponders
are now required for all new aircraft in Class A, B, or C airspace higher than 5,000´
MSL. They will soon be required for all aircraft except in remote locations. Flying at
night or in IFR now requires transponders everywhere and for all aircraft.11
2.1.2. UAV Operations
Currently, UAVs are restricted to special use airspace. Permission to fly outside of
these designated airspaces requires special notification. In the US, the FAA requires a
certificate of authorization (COA) which requires at least a 30-day notice to local
administrators, visual meteorological conditions (VMC)**, a route clear of all populated
areas, and constant ground control by a certified pilot.12
Military units pushing for more UAV access to civil airspace have recently been
helped by advances in the commercial UAV market. This has led to an increased
frequency of permitted UAV flights into civil airspace.

**

Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), Visual Flight Rules (VFR), Instrument Meteorological Conditions
(IMC), and Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) are defined more completely in FAR 91.
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Figure 3: European Airspace Designation by Country
(Source: Eurocontrol website)
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Figure 4: Single European Sky Concept
(Source: Eurocontrol website)

The current policy heavily dampens UAV usage. Some UAV operations will
always remain in special use airspace (e.g. experimental tests and target drones), but even
specialized UAVs need better access to the air route system for transition to/from areas of
operation. UAVs could blend in with traffic operating under instrument flight rules (IFR)
with no need for modified regulations. In reality, UAVs would have less impact on
airspace congestion than other types of traffic as their automation will make them more
precise and predictable than piloted traffic. Their full intentions can be known and
deconflicted well in advance. In addition, UAVs, with their different mission, will
largely stay clear of high traffic areas.
From a UAV access perspective, Class A does not present a particular difficult
problem as air routing solves the problem. The American UAV Global Hawk is already
given frequent approval to travel at high altitudes over most of the world and with a
minimum of pre-coordination.13 Even with this, however, Global Hawk must first climb
to altitude within restricted airspace.
With an installed collision avoidance system, as discussed in Section 3, safe UAV
operation in Class B or C is technically possible. As with other aircraft, they would only
be necessary for short transitions. Due to the high traffic volume, however, there is likely
to be opposition to granting access to UAVs.
Accommodation in Class D and E, and G (and in Europe, F), is a problem because
aircraft flying under VFR at lower altitudes are not required to have transponders. It is
the presence of these aircraft, and the freedom that they enjoy, that presents a challenge
for UAVs to join the skies. As discussed in Section 2.3, a collision avoidance system is
9

not sufficient for traffic deconfliction. These same areas are the primary operating region
for small UAVs. These areas have lower traffic densities, but, except for Class G, they
will still have ATS control. Class G is the most problematic as there are no requirements
for radar coverage or communication.
Under the proposed European airspace designations there would be little or no
difficulty integrating UAVs into Class N and Class K. Class U would present all the
same challenges of the current Class E (below 10,000´), Class F, and Class G.
2.1.3. Certification
Another way that aviation agencies increase safety is through their certification
processes. As discussed in the previous section, ICAO SARPs and detailed annexes
provide commonality for certification, but the individual agencies actually grant the
certifications. The multiple approval processes include: registration, airworthiness,
aircrew/operator licensing, and facility certification.14
Many of the regulations covering these certifications will only require minor
changes to accommodate UAVs. The UAV community should make every effort to
conform to already established certification requirements; however, there are currently no
common airworthiness requirements for UAVs.15 When creating regulations for UAVs
certification and operation, it will be important for UAVs to be categorized by the ICAO
definition of aircraft. One near term possibility is to use the restricted category as defined
in FAR 21.25 & 91.313 to allow operation but to prohibit some airspace.
It is reasonable for a tiered structure for avionics capabilities based on UAV class.
This is analogous to the differences in regulation between crop dusters and transatlantic
airliners. The challenge, though, is to make a reasonable classification of the plethora of
UAVs. At the Spanish test center in Torrejón, and in other agencies under Eurocontrol
(See Table 1), UAVs are grouped similarly to that shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Proposed UAV Classification
Class
3
2
1
0

Description

Current
Example

High Altitude, Long
Global Hawk,
Endur. (HALE);
Aerosonde
Stratospheric
Medium Altitude,
Eagle, Predator
Long Endur. (MALE);
Short range
SIVA, ALO,
Pioneer
Mini, and micro
R-Max,
MicroStar

Operating
Altitude
[ft]
>35,000

Beyond LOS

Cruise
Speed
[kts]
>250

>4500

>2000

35,000

Beyond LOS

< 250

4500

2000

18,000

LOS only

< 150

1100

500

<1,000

LOS only

< 100

45

25

10

Range
Restriction

Max Weight
[lb] or [ kg]

Figure 5: UAV Categorization by Flight Envelope Location
(Source: Eurocontrol IABG Report, 2001)

Other classifications exist, but this grouping emphasizes the significant differences
for purposes of airworthiness and air traffic regulations. A UAV should be classified by
whatever parameter gives it the highest classification with respect to altitude. Figure 5 is
taken from a study sponsored by Eurocontrol which draws a correlation among existing
UAVs between weight and the performance envelope. This reinforces that UAVs can be
effectively classified as in Table 3. The grouping is important because it allows
regulations to be constructed that are realistically safe but not too burdensome for the
intended use of the vehicle.

2.2. Air Traffic Service
The second layer of safety for all aviation is the air traffic service or air traffic
system (ATS). It has traditionally been referred to as air traffic control (ATC) and is now
more frequently being titled air traffic management (ATM) to highlight the eventual
11

evolution towards less controlling and more managing. Whatever the terminology used,
this level is active, third party, and higher cost than the first layer. However, it is real
time and flexible. Duties range from pre-coordinated flight plan filing to active radar
separation. The principle technologies involved are the primary surveillance radar and
secondary surveillance radar (SSR). Primary radar detects all traffic by returns of radar
energy reflected from the aircraft surface. As such, it is independent but possesses less
capability for situational awareness. SSR detects cooperating traffic by receiving the
reply signal from the aircrafts´ transponder.
Many technical and regulatory changes are planned for the ATM world. Figure 6
shows the latest system proposal known as future air navigation system (FANS). It is
heavily based on satellite communication (SATCOM) and global navigation satellite
system (GNSS) technology. It is also planned to rely heavily on some type of data link
such as the aircraft communication and reporting system (ACARS). The third layer,
cooperative traffic avoidance, is expected to play a much larger role.16
How will this affect UAVs? If ever implemented, this would theoretically eliminate
the need for a DSA system on UAVs. Instead, UAVs would need to implement the
required data links. In reality, the need for DSA systems must still be pursued for several
reasons. (1) Mandatory participation in the data link is many years off, and it is not
certain. (2) When implemented, there are still likely to be regions in which general
aviation aircraft are not required to participate, similar to the current regions where no
transponder is required. (3) Finally, all aircraft will still need a backup capability in the
event of network failures.

© 1996, 2002, Honeywell Int’l Inc. All rights reserved.

Figure 6: The Future Air Navigation System
(Source: Honeywell website, Permission granted)
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2.3. Cooperative Traffic Avoidance
The third layer consists of onboard systems that cooperatively work to deconflict
traffic. These systems are independent of, but compatible with, ATM detection systems.
Such systems enable aircrews to perform deconfliction on their own. They are active,
first or second person but are “high tech” and high cost. The current weakness of
cooperative systems is the necessity for all aircraft involved to have a compatible
functioning system. As discussed here, multiple proposals are being explored for ways to
add information for traffic that is not self reporting. This has great potential as an
independent automated traffic control technology.
2.3.1. Aircraft Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS)
A more advanced system is the ACAS, formerly called traffic collision avoidance
system (TCAS). As mentioned earlier they function on the signals from the transponder.
The purpose of an ACAS system is to track other aircraft based on their transponder
signal as shown in Figure 7. There are currently three versions of the ACAS system in
use or in some stage of development; TCAS I, II, and ACAS.
TCAS I is simple and less expensive, primarily for general aviation use. It can
interrogate transponders on other aircraft and indicate approximate bearing and relative
altitude (for Mode-C transponders). It has a range of about forty miles. If another aircraft
becomes a potential collision threat, a traffic advisory (TA) is created to alert the pilot.
The pilot must visually identify the intruder and resolve the conflict or receive assistance
from an air traffic controller.
TCAS II is more capable, but the cost to integrate it is about $200,000 US. This
system has been required on all commercial air carriers in the United States since 1994.
In addition to TCAS I capability can issue a resolution advisory (RA) to advise the pilot
what evasive maneuver will deconflict the traffic. There are two types of RAs,
preventive and positive. Preventive RAs instruct the pilot not to change altitude or
heading to avoid a potential conflict. Positive RAs instruct the pilot to climb or descend
at a predetermined rate of 2500 feet per minute to avoid a conflict. TCAS II is capable of
interrogating Mode-C or Mode-S. In the case of both aircraft having Mode-S
interrogation capability, the TCAS II systems communicate with one another and issue
deconflicted RAs.
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Figure 7: ACAS (TCAS) Advisory Envelopes
(Source: Rannoch Corp. website, Permission granted)

ACAS is virtually the same as TCAS II but will allow pilots who receive RAs to
execute lateral deviations as well as climbs/descents.17
2.3.2. Mode-S
The Mode-S data link is a related, but separate, technology development. Through
this link an aircraft will be able to transmit more aircraft information than the older
Mode-C. The basic implementation of this capability is called elementary surveillance
(ELS) and enables aircraft identification, altitude, flight status, system capability reports,
and resolution advisories. The more expensive enhanced surveillance (EHS) capabilities
include reports on velocity, turning, and vertical intentions.18
2.3.3. ADS-B
Automatic dependent surveillance, broadcast (ADS-B) is a dependent and
cooperative surveillance system that holds great promise. The principle is to
automatically transmit various aircraft parameters (identification, position, intended
route, and speed) via data link to other aircraft and ground stations. The recipients can
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then process or reject the messages based on position. While the ADS-B technology is
merely a communication means, its application for airspace surveillance and traffic
deconfliction is defined in the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics publication
RTCA /DO-181A. Also, it is being examined for use with automated avoidance
maneuver systems. Before implementation it would have to be integrated with current
surveillance systems. EUROCONROL´s ADS program and the FAA´s Safe Flight 21
program are currently testing this data link. Three options have been proposed:

•
•
•

Mode-S “extended squitter” or 1090 data link
Very high frequency (VHF) Data link (VDL) Mode 4
UAT (Universal access transceiver)

Mode-S is already in place and the “extended squitter” only requires a software
modification whereas the other options require new equipment. For operation, the
transponder transmits a data string, or squitter, that is twice as long as the current 56 bit
Mode-S squitter. The total ADS-B message requires several squitters which transmit
with various update rates. The system is capable of a large traffic volume, and the
possible range is between 60 and 100 NM. The extended squitter protocol has been
standardized by ICAO and its necessary EUROCAE/RTCA documentation has been
published.
VDL Mode 4 is a self-organizing time division multiple access (STDMA) system.
It is GPS synchronized, and users transmit during reserved slots based on a reservation
map. Each message is 256 bits. For more capacity, a ground station can regulate usage
or more frequencies can be added. VDL has very good range (140 and 200 NM), and its
protocol has been standardized by ICAO and is detailed in EUROCAE/RTCA
documentation. It was developed in Sweden and is supported by the Swedish Civil
Aviation; however, it does not appear to be the data link of choice for either the other
European or American aviation agencies.
The UAT was developed in America by MITRE. Unlike VDL Mode 4, the
equipment operates on one single frequency and is capable of functioning in any aviation
frequency band. It has a data exchange rate of 1 million bits per second (Mbps). In the
UAT concept, users transmit a data structure, of about 3200 data slots, every second.
UAT does not require synchronization and allows messages of 128 or 256 bits to be
transmitted, including all information required by DO-242. The FAA has tested
prototypes and has chosen it (along with the Mode-S extended squitter data link) for
ADS-B; however, it has not been standardized by ICAO and no RTCA documentation
has been created.19
Like ACAS, ADS-B requires all traffic to have working transponders. As shown in
Table 2, this requirement is met in Class A, B, and C airspace, but it does not provide
protection in the rest of the civil airspace where nonparticipating aircraft are allowed.
This was the reason for the development of TIS-B, as described in the next section.
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2.3.4. Traffic Information Services-Broadcast (TIS-B)
The FAA, as part of Project Safe Flight 21, is evaluating an additional capability
called TIS-B. In this system traffic information from ground surveillance sources is
broadcast to ADS-B equipped aircraft. Updates will come about every 5 to 20 seconds
(as compared to every second for ADS-B broadcasts). This will complete the air traffic
picture in airspace where not all aircraft are using transponders. A current advisory-only
service is in use.
This system is still limited to the areas that have both radar coverage and an ADS-B
broadcast source. Also, more development is needed in the processes that correlate ADSB reports with corresponding radar returns from the same aircraft.
2.3.5. Cooperative Avoidance Options for UAVs
Small UAVs not originally designed to carry transponders can take advantage of
some new developments targeted at the recreational flying community. A class of light
aviation transponder has been designed and approved specifically for small aircraft. By
definition it is Class 2 equipment restricted to use below 15,000´ and 175 knots, but it
will fulfill the requirements of the Eurocontrol ELS and complies with ICAO Annex 10
Amendment 77. Several manufacturers are marketing them with Mode-S capability.
In order to use the information being reported by other participating aircraft, UAVs
must be equipped with an ACAS or a traffic advisory system (TAS). L-3 Avionics
Systems has developed a TAS, called Skywatch and Skywatch HP, specifically for small
aircraft. It is low weight (11 pounds), low power (160 W), and low cost (approx. $25,000
US). It is capable of detecting cooperative traffic at distances in excess of 35 NM and
generating corresponding alerts and advisories for transmission to the ground control
station (GCS). This system has been tested by NASA and is being considered by the US
Navy.20 This possibility is one of the recommended alternatives discussed in Section 6.
2.3.6. Issues to “See and be Seen”
As an aside, the UAV community must improve their own “seeing and being seen”.
Due to their generally smaller size and lack of reflective surfaces such as windshields,
UAVs make harder visual targets. While this may be desirable for military applications,
it is a negative characteristic in civil airspace. Some authors have proposed incorporating
things such as sequential lighting flashes and high visibility paint as passive methods to
improve visibility. Also, “wing flash” maneuvers and automated radio call outs may be
programmed to correspond to traffic advisories from installed DSA equipment. To date,
no regulatory agencies have discussed making any of these options mandatory.

2.4. Detect, See and Avoid
The last layer of safety is the independent ability for each aircraft to detect and
avoid other aircraft. In uncontrolled airspace, the inherent freedom means that all
responsibility for separation lies with the pilot. In other airspace, see and avoid is still
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required to be practiced to the maximum extent possible. The primary example of DSA
is human scanning, but some aircraft (mostly military) augment this with systems using
radar or other means of detection. Ironically for UAVs, the fact that other aircraft have
pilots makes it necessary for UAVs to have DSA. Relative to other layers of safety, DSA
is “high tech” and high cost. Options for use are covered in Section 5.
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3. DSA System Evaluations
The following is a list of evaluation topics (also called system performance
parameters and system characteristics) that must be considered in order to evaluate the
effectiveness and suitability of a DSA system: 21
1. System Performance
1.1. Time to collision
1.2. Tracking accuracy
1.3. Field of regard
1.4. Integrity
2. Physical characteristics
2.1. Size and Shape
2.2. Weight
2.3. Physical interference
2.4. Power and Cooling
3. Interoperability
3.1. Aircraft interface
3.2. Electromagnetic interference/Compatibility
3.3. External compatibility
4. Human factors
5. Logistics
These are quantifiable and should be addressed in any decision making process.
While any unsatisfactory result is a problem, these topics are ranked in the normal order
of product development. For example, new systems generally must meet performance
thresholds in concept demonstrators or prototypes. Then, viable alternatives can be
evaluated based on the platform-specific limitations of physical characteristics and other
requirements. Evaluating these systems in the most efficient manner requires a
sequential test program through laboratory, ground, and flight test phases.

3.1. System Performance
For DSA technology, the ultimate performance requirement is: provide traffic
conflict information in sufficient time to prevent midair collisions. A test program to
fully prove DSA system effectiveness in realistic scenarios would require thousands of
flight hours involving many aircraft. Judicious use of design of experiments (DOE)
principles can significantly reduce the test matrix while maintaining a high confidence
level. Even more reductions can be made by quantifying the critical technical parameters
that are necessary to achieve success and using those values as performance
requirements. Using these lower-level criteria reduces time and cost because it makes
laboratory and ground testing possible and reduces necessary flight testing.
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3.1.1. Time to Collision
Defining a sufficient amount of reaction time is not trivial. The DSA system must
detect traffic with sufficient time for the remaining evasion steps to occur. The time
before collision (tc- ) is a function of detection range and aircraft velocity as follows:
t c- = R

3.1

vc

where:
R – Range to target at time tcvc – Closure velocity (or range rate).

In real life vc is not a constant value and is based on both aircraft velocities (v1, v2)
and the angles in azimuth ( Ψ ) and elevation ( Θ ) between the two aircraft as shown:
vc = dR

dt

= ( (v1· cos (Ψ 1 ) cos (Θ1 )) + (( v 2· cos (Ψ 2 ) cos (Θ2 ))

3.2

For radar systems the maximum Range (Rmax) is given by Stimson22 as:
Rmax = 4

Pavg GσA e t ot

(4π )2 S min

Radar Systems

3.3

where:
Pavg – Average power
G – Antenna gain
σ – Target radar cross section (RCS)
Ae – Effective antenna area. (Product of the physical area and an efficiency factor)
tot – Time on target, dwell time, or integration time
Smin – Minimum detectable signal energy
Except for RCS and dwell time, these parameters are all limitations of the physical
system. Increases in range through increases in the power, gain, or area invariably come
with consequence in weight, size, power, and money.
The frequency of operation is also a significant factor as it affects the gain, size, and
weight of the system. It is also given by Stimson as:
G=

(4π )Ae
λ2

3.4

Radar Systems
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where:
λ – Wavelength (equal to the speed of light (c) divided by frequency (f); λ= c/f)
Thus, the aperture size decreases or the gain increases proportionally to the square
of the frequency. This makes radar systems operating at higher frequencies attractive
options for UAV installation where payload is limited.
For target RCS, most specifications use a 3 m2. To effectively use the dwell time
parameter, it is important to design a good scanning technique as discussed later. The
optimal dwell time is a trade off with revisit rate and field of regard (FOR). The longer
one dwells in any one part of the sky, the longer it takes to view the total area of
observation.
For infrared imaging systems, the range is related to angular resolution by23:
R = WR/ΘR

Infrared Systems

3.5

where:
WR – Linear resolution (minimum resolvable distance or diameter of target)
ΘR – Angular resolution [rad]. The inverse of the spatial cut-off frequency (fs, co)
For all imaging systems, the resolution is a function of the number of picture
elements (pixels). A higher pixels count means dots to fill the image which leads to
greater resolution. However, high resolution imaging creates challenges for the
processing system because of the large quantities of data that must be analyzed in real
time.
For systems using laser technology the maximum detection range is determined by
the required power (PR ) which can be determined by the laser range equation given by
the U.S. Test Pilot School Handbook24 as:
PR =

PXMTR D 2 ρ T
η ATM 2 ⋅η XMTR ⋅η RCVR
2
4R

Laser Systems

where:
R – Range to target
PXMTR -- Power in the transmission path of the laser
D – Detector aperture diameter
ρT – Target reflectivity
ηATM – Transmissivity, atmospheric
ηXMTR – Transmissivity, transmission path of the laser
ηRCVR – Transmissivity, receiver path of the detector
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3.6

Unless a system is capable of simultaneous omni-directional monitoring, this stated
tc- is not sufficient. After detection, the DSA system must track the traffic to determine if
a conflict exists. This requires at least three scans for accurate determination (real world
trajectories will be arcs). Thus the tc- is also a function of revisit rate. It must be assumed
that the traffic is just outside of maximum detection range in the previous scan. Thus the
distance the traffic can close before being detected and tracked is equal to the closure rate
times the time the system takes to perform three complete scans (3·tr). Substituting this
into equation 3.1 yields an actual time to collision of:

t c- =

R-( 3t r vc )
R
=
-3t r
vc
vc

3.7

As mentioned before, a longer dwell time increases the range for radar systems.
For electro-optical systems, an increase in range requires an increase in sensitivity which
also requires a longer dwell time. However, these longer dwell times increase the time
required to scan the entire area. Therefore, revisit rate and maximum detection range are
conflicting parameters of the time to collision requirement. This necessary trade off is
seldom discussed in product literature, but it should be considered for new system
evaluation.
Section 4 discusses the necessary performance for the time to collision requirement.
From the DSA system perspective, it must complete its detection, tracking, and
predicting in adequate time for an avoidance maneuver. For operations that are not LOS
the time requirement is lengthened by the necessary relay time. Onboard automated
avoidance maneuver systems would be much more responsive, but they add another level
of yet unproven technology.
Predicted performance can be obtained from the given equations. The necessary
parameters will be available from applicable regulations or manufacturer data. This
performance can be evaluated in laboratory tests, but flight tests are still necessary to
verify all derived results in a real world environment. Certification will require
verification flight tests as well.
3.1.2. Tracking Accuracy
The accuracy of the system must be evaluated in order to determine the level of
uncertainty for each track. Once determined, errors for range, range rate, azimuth angle,
and elevation angle must be used in the preceding calculations. This is so that, even with
errors present, the necessary time to collision requirement would be met. Most errors can
be predicted by using the given performance equations and estimating parameter
uncertainties.
The minimum ambiguity in range and resolution can be determined through
equations specific to the system technology, and these variables can be checked in
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laboratory testing. The determination of actual system accuracy can only be
accomplished through flight test with a proven truth source for comparison.
3.1.3. Field of Regard
The field of view (FOV) is the angular amount a system can observe at one time.
Field of regard (FOR) is the complete area that the system can put into its FOV through
slewing or other means. For fixed sensors the FOR is equal to the FOV. Some sources
use the term scan envelope instead. Limitations such as obstructions and gimbal limits
may create an unsymmetrical FOR.
It is necessary for a DSA system to provide coverage in the entire area of
responsibility. Ideally, the system would provide +/-180° in azimuth (AZ) and +/-90 ° in
elevation (EL); that is, total coverage. As Section 4 discusses, however, total coverage is
not required.
The threshold requirement for the FOR must be established by regulation. Installed
system ground tests can evaluate the system FOR.
3.1.4. Integrity
System integrity is a measure of how well the data can be trusted. For a DSA
system it is the probability for missed traffic, false alarms, or incorrect prioritization of
intruders. The technical reasons for these problems include target location ambiguities,
improper noise rejection, terrain reflections, and errors by predictive algorithms. The
tracking accuracy also plays a part as discussed previously.
Ideally, the system would have a 0 % probability of missed traffic and a 0 % error
rate. This is impossible to achieve much less evaluate. Aviation systems already have
established threshold levels of safety that apply to these systems. If a DSA system is
functioning as the primary method of separation, and traffic on a conflicting flight path is
non-cooperative, then a missed or incorrect detection could lead to a midair collision. In
this scenario, the chance of a collision is a compound probability consisting of the
statistical chance of two aircraft being on intersecting flight paths, both arriving at the
same point at the same time, and the DSA system not detecting or predicting it would
happen. If a mishap were to occur it would fall under the definition of a catastrophic
event and so requires the probability of occurrence to be less than 10-9 events/hour.25
That is once every billion hours of operation. This can only be realistically evaluated in
modeling and simulation.
Conversely, a false alarm or incorrect prioritization qualifies as an annoyance
factor. Determining an acceptable frequency of occurrence for these requires some
subjective analysis, but should be considered a human factors issue as discussed in
requirement 4.
System integrity also concerns evaluations of self-monitoring and graceful
degradation. A critical system, such as DSA, must detect its own degraded operation and
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alert the user. It must also be capable of continuing at the best level possible in the
presence of partial failures. An example of this is a detection system that loses its
vertical scanning capability, but reacts by: detecting the failure, alerting the user, and
continuing to report traffic in azimuth only.
Requirements for failure alerts and information reliability will very likely model
those developed for other traffic systems such as ACAS. Evaluation and certification
must be done in laboratory testing where deliberate failures can be executed.

3.2. Physical Characteristics
The physical characteristics of a proposed DSA system regard the issue of
suitability for a particular aircraft. The actual values for these criteria will be platformspecific, but all categories must be considered.
3.2.1. Size and Shape
Is there room? This criterion is the limiting factor on many radar systems. Lower
frequencies require larger antennae. The shape is also important as there are possible
aerodynamic concerns for the externally mounted sections. A recent C-130 missile
detection system encountered unexpected problems in this area and required
modification, wind tunnel tests, and multiple additional flight test hours.
For complete size criteria the following limitations must be stated: (1) the
maximum available dimensions at all internal installation locations. (2) The external
surface area available for mounting, or availability of attachment points.
Determining the external shape requirements is more difficult. There are no
textbook answers, but limitations will be encountered from one of two possibilities: either
the contribution to parasitic drag, or flying qualities degradation. Wind tunnel tests are
required. Flying qualities flight testing may be necessary.
3.2.2. Weight
The system weight limitations are derived from more that just payload capacity. If
the weight and balance of the aircraft are significantly altered, it is an issue for stability
and control. Also, there may be structural issues due to increased loads in specific areas.
Analysis must be performed for each proposed installation location to determine the
maximum permissible weight. Threshold limitations can probably be established by
deduction with the aid of aircraft manufacturer data; however, some of the flying
qualities data may need to be re-verified by wind tunnel and flight test.
3.2.3. Physical Interference
The physical interference challenge is the most significant limitation of propellerdriven aircraft. The propeller and engine greatly limit options for systems that require
unobstructed forward views with a high FOR. Many small UAV designs are
incorporating pusher-type propulsion systems which frees up the front, but it inhibits rear
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traffic detection. Mounting systems on the wings is possible, but structures limitations
often make this option difficult as well.
3.2.4. Power and Cooling
The power and cooling limitations are determined by evaluating excess capability
of the system. All electronics use power and produce heat, so if available aircraft
capabilities are insufficient, DSA installation will have to be accompanied by an upgrade
in the power system and/or cooling system. This may significantly increase total cost.
Power requirements can be satisfactorily determined from manufacturer data and
laboratory testing. Cooling requirements can be estimated in the same manner, but
normally require installed ground tests for more accuracy.

3.3. Interoperability
DSA systems, by definition, are independent of other layers of safety however; they
must operate as a “system of systems”, both among other onboard systems as well as in
the surrounding airspace.
3.3.1. Internal Interfaces
The DSA system will need ownship data (velocity, altitude, heading, and rates) in
order to calculate and display traffic information. It must be able to get this information
by interfacing with the other onboard systems. This means being properly integrated into
the aircraft bus, if one exists, or being wired to other systems and using the proper
communication protocols.
This requirement can be evaluated in laboratory tests.
3.3.2. Electromagnetic Interference/Compatibility
All new developmental efforts that emit or receive emissions must be concerned
about the effect of operating among other systems. Unexpected problems in this area
have cost the recent Link-16 data link development effort millions of dollars. In addition
to added expense, problems with electromagnetic interference/compatibility (EMI/EMC)
can have critical safety and legal implications. Changes are much cheaper to make
before aircraft installation, so a detailed evaluation of the possible risks is paramount.
EMI/EMC testing requires specialized equipment during ground tests.
3.3.3. External Compatibility
In addition to EMC, DSA systems will have to demonstrate that they do not degrade
the integrity of information for other traffic control systems. For example, if queried by
another aircraft using an ACAS or ADS-B system (as discussed in Section 3), the UAVs
must be able to properly respond with valid data in a compatible format.
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This requirement can be evaluated in laboratory tests and verified concurrently with
other flight tests.

3.4. Human Factors
Human factors evaluations examine the suitability of the system for real world use.
Since DSA systems are not a part of the primary mission, it needs to operate with the
minimum of operator attention. Inputs and responses must be able to be performed while
taking a very small percentage of the operator’s time.
To achieve this, the controls and displays must be evaluated for clarity and logical
man machine interface (MMI). In addition, any algorithms used to aid operator decisions
must be timely and accurate. Standardized symbology should be used to the maximum
amount that such exists. The system should be capable of accurate prioritizing and
correlating of traffic. The operator should have the ability to selectively declutter or
adjust display settings. Finally, all warnings and alerts must be clear and sufficiently
intrusive.
No generic values can be given for the evaluation of these requirements, but they
are not totally subjective. Many studies have attempted to quantify acceptable human
factors. The applicable regulations should be used. Human factors evaluations require
flight time as they must be used in the actual operational environment, however, they
should be performed concurrently with other activities.

3.5. Logistics
The logistical considerations for any new technology are the things that decide if a
good concept can actually be a good product. The three main issues for logistical
considerations are reliability, maintainability, and availability.26 For DSA systems they
can be quantified as:
Reliability = hours of operation / operational failures [hours]
- known as mean time between failure or (MTBF)
Maintainability = maintenance hours / operating hours
- known as Maint. Ratio (MR). Function of MTBF and required servicing.
Availability = MTBF / (MTBF + maintenance time) [%]
- the amount of time the system will be available for use.
The last two issues are concerns for their cost and operational impact, but reliability
is a safety of flight concern. As such, a regulatory value must be established for this
issue. Logistics evaluations are conducted concurrently with other testing and for the
duration of the test program.
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4. DSA Necessary Performance
Governing agencies have required UAVs to demonstrate an “equivalent level of
safety” (ELOS) to manned aircraft27. A complete definition of exactly what that is would
offer an answer to the question of, “How good is good enough?” for DSA systems on
UAVs. If that were done, airworthiness requirements could be directly derived from that
definition. Unfortunately, no such definition has been endorsed by any regulating
agency. While many vendors present their proposals as “how much better than nothing”,
many critics emphasize “how much less than perfect”.

4.1. Equivalent Level of Safety
While ICAO regulations do not define the required level of DSA performance, they
have established see and avoid areas of responsibility.28 Studies from multiple research
agencies are listed in Table 4 as technical answers to the equivalent level of safety of a
human pilot; however, those same studies also note that this level is not adequate.29
As shown in the notes, the warning time needed prior to a potential collision is
based on two things. The first component is the reaction time to the collision threat.
Research for this component has been performed by the Australian Traffic Safety Board
(formerly BASI). Their results are listed in Figure 8. These values are generally
accepted by the aviation community and have been cited in multiple accident
investigations and subsequent research. Since they apply to piloted aircraft, they require
modification for UAV operations (see Section 4.2.1).

Table 4: Required Performance and Human Ability
Parameter

Required Performance

No value given
Sufficient for a safe miss distance
(>500’). Speed dependent
No value given
Detection
Range Sufficient to achieve warning time
requirement

Time to Collision
Warning

Revisit
Rate
Resolution

Field of Regard
Traffic Volume

Sufficient to achieve tracking
within warning time requirement
Sufficient to achieve tracking at
required range.
+/-110° Azimuth
+/-30° Elevation
Sufficient for most crowded
airspace (up to 12)

Source of
requirement

Human
performance

Source

N/A

Requires
greater than
18.2 sec. 1
1.14 to 1.84
NM
for 90%
confidence
16 sec

N/A

0.3 mrad

1991 BASI
report
& calculations
Lincoln Labs
test, 1989.
AFRL Study,
2002
FAA-P-874051
“Modern
Optical
Engineering”
W. Smith
N/A

FAA-P-8740-51.
FAA Order 8700.1,
Ch. 169
N/A

(ICAO Annex 2)
“Rules of the Air”
Derived from
EUROCONROL
website statistics link

+/-180° AZ
+/-30° EL
Up to 5

Note: 1: That is, 12.5 seconds for pilot and 5.7 seconds for avoidance maneuver (non fighter or aerobatic).
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FAA-P-874051

F igu re 8: T im e to R eact to a C ollision T h reat
(S ou rce: B A S I R ep ort, 1991)

The aircraft lag time of two seconds is the one component of the reaction time that
is system dependent. Both the time for aircraft systems to respond to the control input,
and the time to reach the desired flight attitude are included in this time. Evaluations
done at INTA confirmed that this value is appropriate for aircraft that are not designed
for high agility operations.
The second component is the time required for the aircraft to complete the
avoidance maneuver. Engineers at INTA did not find any prior research for determining
the required maneuver time for a given speed and bank angle. A study was undertaken to
define this component for all aircraft including UAVs. The conclusions are explained
below.
4.1.1. Conclusions of INTA Study on Avoidance Maneuvers
Due to the closer proximity of traffic, avoidance maneuvers for DSA systems will
have to be much more abrupt than those programmed for cooperative systems such as
ACAS. An aircraft will avoid a hazardous incident, as defined by the FAA, if it is able to
alter its flight path in order to remain at least 500 ft from the traffic.
In the vertical plane, the UAVs tested at INTA operate with too little excess thrust
or airspeed for a zoom maneuver (rapid climb) to be a viable option. This is true for most
all small aircraft. A dive would yield the most rapid change in trajectory, but it is an
undesirable option due to the effects of negative g-forces on the systems and payloads.
Furthermore, unapproved changes in altitude while on an IFR flight plan may unsafely
complicate the scenario for both controllers and operators.
For these reasons, avoidance through a change in the horizontal plane is preferred.
Analysis was performed to calculate the time necessary to complete a horizontal
27
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b=s=v*tf
(flt paths)
θ =s/r= ω*tf
γ = (90 - θ /2), ϕ =(90 - γ)= θ /2
a=2r*sin( θ/2)
2
(rf )2 = b +a 2-2ab*cos( ϕ) (by Lawof Cosines)

r=f(v, φ) ω= f(v, φ)

Figure 9: Avoidance Maneuver, General Solution

maneuver. Figure 9 shows the geometry for the generalized (no specific velocity or bank
angle) worst case scenario. In this scenario, a warning was given at the minimum alert
time based on a predicted collision at time (tf) if the aircraft continued on flight path (b).
The time (tf) is measured from the conclusion of the reaction time mentioned previously.
The aircraft miss distance (rf ) must be a minimum of 500’ as defined by the FAA. The
aircraft’s actual trajectory (s) is based on the maximum response performed during the
reaction time which results in the bank angle (φ). For illustration a right turn is used, but
it is done so without any loss of generalization. The solution is achieved using the Law
of Cosines, the derivation of which can be found in any geometry textbook. Any changes
in altitude or reductions in airspeed will improve the separation distance.
The turn radius and the turn rate of an aircraft in level flight can be solved using the
following equations derived by the USAF Test Pilot School30:
r=

v2
g n 2 -1

; and ω =

g n 2 -1
v

4.1 & 4.2

where
v – velocity
g – force of gravity
n – load factor; which is equal to the inverse of the cosine of the bank angle.
r – turn radius
ω – turn rate
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Combining the equations of the generalized solution with equations 4.1 and 4.2
yields the following:

r = (v t f
2
f

)

2

ωt 
ωt 
ωt


+  2r sin  2 f   − 2 2r sin  2 f  (v t f )cos 2 f 








2

4.3

with all values defined as in Figure 9 and equations 4.1 and 4.2 listed previously.
The INTA study sought to deduce the proper values for the variables in the above
equation. It concluded that a maximum bank angle (φ) of 45° should be used for several
reasons. First, many UAVs and small aircraft are limited in bank angle to 60°. A
maximum rate turn should not be performed to the maximum allowable bank angle due to
the consequences overshooting the bank angle limit. Secondly, the short timeline limits
the amount of time available to execute the maneuver. The study found that the UAVs
were capable of roll rates between 20 and 30° per second; these are common values of
normal small aircraft. At these roll rates, higher bank angles would require more time
than allotted for the execution of the maneuver. Thirdly, as the bank angle increases
beyond this value, the viewing geometry (for pilot or sensor) becomes a factor. At some
angle, dependent on aircraft type and viewing position, it will not be possible to keep the
traffic in sight throughout the turn. Finally, g-force, and the proportional accelerated stall
speed, increase inversely to the cosine of φ which means the rate of increase becomes
very high at high angles.
Since some aircraft may have other factors which require using a different value for
the maximum bank angle, the general equation was solved for a range of φ and is
presented in Figure 10.
One example of additional limitations is that satellite links frequently limited UAVs
to φ= 15° during beyond LOS operations. The INTA study found that this should be
programmed as a “soft stop”, but, if necessary, the DSA system should be allowed the
maximum φ. The maneuver duration will be very short, so the link may not be lost. If it
is lost, automated procedures for re-establishing the satellite connection are possible once
the aircraft has returned to level flight.
A fact that is not intuitively obvious, but that falls out of the calculations, is that the
warning time requirement is not speed dependent. The required detection distance is
proportional to the closure velocity, but the turn rate is inversely proportional to closure
velocity. In the time to collision calculations these two factors cancel out the speed
dependence.
Based on the above study, and using equation 4.3, the time necessary to complete
the avoidance maneuver with a φmax = 45° is tf = 5.7 seconds.
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Fig ure 9 : Time to Clear Traffic (by bank ang le)

Figure 10: Time to Clear Traffic (by Bank Angle)

As already mentioned, studies show that the human level of safety is not
sufficient.31 To illustrate this, we use equation 3.1:
t c- = R

(3.1)
vc
as defined in Section 3. Using the optimal human performance values listed in
Table 5 (R=1.84 NM and necessary tc- = 18.2 sec), the maximum closure velocity (vc_max)
safely protected by human see and avoid is:
vc_max = 364 knots

Human ability, optimal.

This does not take into account the human scan rate. The FAA recommends that
pilots rescan every 16 seconds. More frequent complete area scans are a worthy goal but
difficult to achieve during high task operations. At this recommended rate, any particular
area of view is only observed once every 16 seconds. With this necessary time to
collision (tc- = 34.2 sec), the maximum safe closure velocity is:
vc_max = 194 knots

Human ability, practical.

GA aircraft are normally performance limited to less than 150 knots, so the optimal
value would seem to be sufficient; however, aircraft can legally fly at speeds of 200 knots
in airport areas and 250 knots elsewhere (refer to Section 2.1.1) below 10,000´. This
means aircraft below 10,000´ in Class E or higher airspace must be able to prevent
against collisions with closure velocities up to 500 knots (two aircraft traveling head on at
250 knots). This corresponds to a required visual detection range of 4.8 NM. Even
considering the speed limited aircraft mentioned before (150 knots ownship means
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closure velocity up to 400 knots), the required visual detection range is 3.8 NM or twice
that of the human ability! These results are compared to those for UAVs in Section 5.2.1.
Due to the geometry, off angle traffic will have significantly lower closure
velocities as shown by Equation 3.2. The required time to collision reduces
proportionally which means a DSA system capable of non-uniform scanning could be
programmed to do a weighted distribution of scan time and increase effective system
performance.
Above 10,000´ there is no speed restriction except for those prohibiting supersonic
flight. With only the Mach limitation, closure velocities can theoretically be over 1200
knots true air speed. However, at that altitude working transponders are required which
means cooperative avoidance systems can be used. As discussed, even in the absence of
any ATS radar assistance systems such as ACAS are capable of deconflicting traffic at
distances sufficient for all closure velocities of subsonic aircraft.

4.2. Necessary Performance for UAVs
ICAO provides two ways to determine if a new system is acceptably safe: (1)
comparison to a reference system, and (2) evaluation of system risks against a threshold.
The first method is a relative method in that all the characteristics of the new system are
compared with the corresponding characteristics of a reference system that is already
determined to be sufficiently safe. The second method requires the advocating party to
quantify the system performance and compare against an approved risk level.32
Using method one, advocates of UAV operations have compared their systems
against human performance. This approach has been ill fated because of the evidence
that discredits the sufficiency of the reference system (namely, accident reports that find
unaided human performance legal but insufficient for some conditions). Therefore,
UAVs will ultimately have to prove their safety by method two.
In reviewing the data of Table 5 with this approach in mind, the following
adjustments must be made to the performance requirements.
4.2.1. Revised Time to Collision

As discussed previously, the time to collision capability of a system is a function of
revisit rate, detection range, and/or resolution. For determining what DSA system
performance is necessary, the required performance should be modified to consider
several factors. At the time an alert is issued, the detection and recognition stages have
already occurred. This leaves 6.4 seconds of the timeline shown in Figure 8.
UAVs being operated by satellite link (Class 2 and 3) will have a transmission time
which must be added to the reaction time twice, once for the alert and once for the control
message. While the traffic speeds will be the same, UAVs will be limited by Class.
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The transmission time delay consists of a propagation component and a relay
processing component. Propagation time is the result of transmission range divided by
the speed of light. This results in a time delay of 6.18 µsec per nautical mile. Processing
of the message will be negligible because the message size is small enough to be
completely transmitted in a single transmission. A total of one second for one-way
transmission time is sufficient for world-wide coverage. Autonomous DSA operation
will not need this additional time except for operator override. Modifying Figure 8 with
these considerations results in the Figure 11.
Using the equations given in Section 3, an automated system with the capability of
resolution advisories and a revisit rate of 1 Hz could provide the necessary alert time to a
pilot with a detection range of only 2.0 NM. This improvement over the values quoted in
Section 4.1 are due to the higher revisit rate and the reduction in time to react as shown in
Figure 11. A comparison of the human and automatic requirements is made in Figure 12.
4.2.2. Field of Regard

By ICAO regulation, all aircraft are responsible for taking action to avoid traffic in
an area consisting of +/-110° in azimuth and +/-30° in elevation. This means that UAVs
must be able to do their part of deconfliction with any aircraft that enters this region.
Additional coverage is desired from a “defensive driving” perspective, but meeting this
FOR requirement satisfies the law.
4.2.3. Traffic Volume

This parameter insures that a DSA system would be able to cope with the highest
traffic densities likely to be encountered. Modern computers have no problem far
exceeding this number of simultaneous predictions, but the system must be able to also
prioritize in order to advise of the highest threat at all times.
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Figure 11: Time to React to a Collision Threat, UAV Version
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4.3. Proposed UAV Requirements
Based on the preceding sections, some basic requirements become apparent for all
UAVs regardless of operation. The following is a proposed list of requirements that
should be met for all UAV flights within civil airspace:
Certification: Be certified for flight in civil airspace. This certification should state
that, in addition to meeting applicable existent airworthiness requirements, UAVs
demonstrate fault-tolerant flight control, data link, and flight termination systems.
Approved airfields: Operate only out of airfields approved for UAV operations.
Preflight: File an IFR flight plan in accordance with all IFR requirements. Flight
plan will indicate UAV status and secondary method for contact (e.g. land line).
Communications: Maintain communication with applicable ATS at all times.
Navigation: Maintain a contingency flight plan in the event of loss of
communication. The contingency plan will be dynamically updated to remain in
accordance with procedures for radio out (NORDO) IFR throughout the flight.
Identification: Broadcast and receive a Mode S transponder signal regardless of
airspace requirements for piloted aircraft.
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The first two requirements are reasonable and most sources are in consensus. This
gives the national authority control over what is approved. Once the requirements are
specified, the advocating organization will have a clear process for securing approval.
Being on an IFR flight plan is reasonable since, in essence, the operator is flying IFR.
The communications requirement can be met in one of two ways as discussed below.
The requirement for a loss of communication procedure that meets IFR NORDO
requirements is a logical extension of the requirements for piloted aircraft. The
contingency flight plan must be dynamic because the proper course of action will vary
based on stage of flight and what ATS clearances have been received prior to
communication failure. The Mode S requirement may soon become a requirement for all
powered flight in controlled airspace. For now, it should alleviate concerns among the
commercial community as they will be able to detect and avoid all UAVs at great
distances.
In addition to those overarching requirements, the necessary equipment by UAV
Class is listed in Table 5. With the implementation of these modifications, the derived
necessary level of performance for DSA systems to be used on UAVs is listed in Table 6.
As demonstrated in Section 4.1, these requirements provide a greater level of safety
than what is required of piloted aircraft. This is in order to meet the necessary level of
safety. Due to their ability to travel beyond LOS, Class 2 and 3 UAVs must have satellite
links. Their radio communications will also have to be relayed to the GCS via satellite as
ATS will not be LOS with the GCS. Class 1 UAVs are not required to have a satellite
link for control and can provide the link through some means other than onboard radios.

Table 5: UAV Proposed Requirements
Class

Description

3

HALE

2

MALE

ATS Communication

ACAS

DSA

Onboard radio & Sat.
data link
Onboard radio & Sat.
data link
GCS com. with ATS 2
No

Yes

Yes

DSA autonomous
operation allowed
Yes

Yes

Yes3

No

1
Short range
No 4
Yes 3
No
1
0
Mini and micro
No
No
--Notes:
1. Class 0 will not operate in civil airspace except by the COA process already in place.
2. Class 1 UAV communication requirement may be met through direct link between ATS and GCS.
3. In airspace with full radar coverage and operational TIS-B: DSA requirement may be met by
ACAS system capable of ADS-B. Radar coverage can be general ATS or specific UAV support.
4. Except operations above 10,000´ require ACAS due to increased traffic speeds.
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Table 6: DSA Necessary Performance for UAVs
Parameter
Time to Collision
Warning
Detection Range &
Revisit Rate

Required Performance
Class 3 & 2

14.2 sec

Sufficient for a safe miss distance (>500’) below 10,000´.1

Class 1

12.2 sec

Value is for head-on traffic. Less for off angle traffic.
Sufficient to achieve tracking within warning time
requirement.

Minimum to achieve time
requirements above:
Class 3 & 2
2.0 NM
Class 1

Resolution

Notes

1.4 NM
--

Field of Regard

+/-110° Azimuth
+/-30° Elevation

Traffic Volume

> 10

Sufficient to achieve tracking at required range including
worst case scenario ambiguities.
Required performance: Those dictated in the ICAO “Right of
Way rules”.
Desired performance: Total spherical area.
Busiest airspace densities for UAV operation

Note:
1: Includes transmission, reaction, and maneuver time; also, for Classes 2 & 3, propagation time.

The International Technical Committee on Unmanned Air Vehicle Systems (ASTM
F38) has created a standard for DSA systems, Standard F 2411-04. It was created after
input from many segments of the aviation community. It is still unclear if aviation
regulatory agencies will embrace this new standard for certification purposes.33
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5. DSA Analysis of Alternatives
To meet the requirements specified in Section 4, multiple possibilities exist. Figure
13 shows several key regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Any feasible DSA
solution will likely operate in one of these regions due to their atmospheric
transmissivity, which is important for achieving the range requirement.
Studies by Amphitech have ranked the performance requirements for possible
technologies that would operate in those areas of the spectrum.34 Their conclusions are
shown in Table 7. They refer to the FOR as the scan envelope but otherwise use the
same proposed requirements mentioned above.
This information is not complete, however. The higher ratings for systems in the
lower frequencies like millimeter wave (MMW) radar are based on the effect that
moderate rain and fog have on higher frequency systems. By definition, these weather
conditions are instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). By regulation, IMC requires
all aircraft to operate under IFR. Being able to protect against possible traffic that is not
on an IFR flight plan, not using a transponder, and flying through fog might be nice, but
it has never been mandatory.
In addition, as discussed in Section 4, there is a trade off between FOR, revisit rate,
and range (or resolution in the case of electro-optics). Thus, technologies with inherent
abilities in one area can make trade offs for improvement in others to make an affordable
alternative that still meets the time to collision warning requirement. Given this, a new
analysis of these technologies is listed in Table 8 rearranged by order of their place on the
electromagnetic spectrum.

F ig u re 1 3 : A tm o sp h eric T ra n s m is sio n p er N M (S ea L ev el)
(S o u rce: N A W C W P N S H a n d b o o k T P 8 3 4 7 )
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Table 7: Amphitech Evaluation of DSA Technology Performance
Sensor technology

Revisit rate Resolution

Adverse
weather

Scan envelope

Time to Collision

Laser Radar

Excellent

Fair

35 GHz MMW radar

Excellent

Excellent

Fair

Excellent

Fair

94 GHz MMW radar

Excellent

Fair

Fair

Excellent

Fair

Visible Imaging

Excellent

Poor

Excellent

Fair

Poor

IR Imaging

Excellent

Poor

Excellent

Fair

Poor

Passive MMW imaging

Excellent

Poor

Fair

Poor

Excellent

Poor

Excellent

Poor

Table 8: Revised Evaluation of DSA Technology Performance
Sensor technology

Time to Collision

Accuracy

FOR

Visible Imaging

Marginal due to range

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

IR Imaging

Marginal due to range

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Laser Radar

Marginal due to revist

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Unsat. due to range

Unsat. due to resolution

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Passive MMW Imaging
MMW radar

The following sections will evaluate all known DSA proposals and applicable
technologies in order of spectral region. System performance and physical characteristics
can be estimated, but other requirements such as interoperability issues, human factors,
and logistical concerns require evaluations on a specific product.

5.1. Visual Imaging
This technology consists of using some form of camera arrangement to establish
situational awareness. It is the most analogous process to that of piloted see and avoid.
Visual imaging is a semi-passive system in that no onboard illumination is needed for
detection. Modern camera technology holds great possibility for small, low power
cameras with very good zoom capabilities. In the future, a virtual reality system could
theoretically give the remote operator the same visual scan as an onboard pilot, but the
bandwidth and equipment requirements would not justify its use simply for DSA. A
more realistic option is using image processing and a target recognition algorithm to
analyze the input for the operator. Several options discussed below have taken this route.
The operator could still be in the loop by cueing cameras to focus on places interest.
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The primary weakness of these systems is that they are limited in the same way as
the human vision. Some technologies (such as those used for night vision goggles,
NVGs) will give satisfactory performance at night, but visual systems degrade greatly in
the presence of water vapor such as rain and fog. As mentioned before, this may not
exclude their use as a DSA system since other cooperative systems can be made the
primary for IMC.
Another inherent difficulty with electro-optical imaging systems is that, unlike
radar, they do not have the capability to directly measure range. This is a big drawback
for DSA systems as this is the primary parameter for calculating traffic avoidance. One
possibility is stereoptic vision with sensors on the wing tips. This would use the same
principle as the human brain to discern the distance of an object by simultaneously
viewing it from two different angles. Unfortunately, this method is only effective at short
distances. Beyond those distances the human being uses assessments of the apparent size
of an object to determine distance.35 A computer could do this as well, but it must know
the actual size of the object. Range rate can be determined simply by measuring the rate
of change in apparent size, but requires very high resolution systems as the apparent size
of an object does not change rapidly until the distance is very small. A more probable
solution to the range problem is to combine the electro-optical system with an eye-safe
invisible laser range designator as discussed in the section for lasers.
There are currently no visual imaging DSA systems in use. The following are
reviews of applicable technologies and proposals.
5.1.1. Panospheric Cameras
Athena and Carnegie-Mellon University have developed a 4 million-pixel,
panospheric, (that is, 360-degree view) electro-optical camera with a vertical FOR of
+10° and -80°.36 Panospheric imaging is a technology developed by a Panoramic
Viewing Systems, Inc. in Canada. This level of resolution and FOR is excellent for DSA
applications, but it creates difficulties for the onboard image processing system and data
link bandwidth. Also, there are processing challenges to correct the distorted image
created by the sensor’s spherical mirror.
By review, this system will be able to meet the FOR requirement and fit within the
physical limitations. Revisit rate would also not be a limitation. There still remain the
possible critical limitations on range and accuracy.
5.1.2. Detection Algorithms
Graduate students at The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm are doing
thesis work on creating efficient detection algorithms for DSA systems. They point out
that current algorithms suffer greatly by factors such as light conditions and the
background clutter. Also, current common market video cameras do not have sufficient
resolution to meet both the range and FOR requirements. This problem is expected to be
reduced as high resolution cameras become sufficiently miniaturized in the future.37
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A review of their research indicates that, at this time, these algorithms are not
mature enough for use in actual systems. It is still not certain if better image processing
alone will be sufficient to overcome the limitations of this area of the spectrum.
5.1.3. Optical TCAS for UAVs
Aurora Flight Sciences Corporation has proposed to combine low-cost visual image
processing devices from the automotive market and the encounter logic developed for
ACAS to create an "Optical TCAS". The company plans to use panospheric mirrors to
achieve 360° coverage without complex scanning systems. The visual image processing
devices are currently being developed by Mercedes-Benz as automotive collision
avoidance devices. To test this system, they propose to use their "Chiron" optionally
piloted aircraft, which, similar to Proteus, can operate as a UAV, but with a safety pilot
onboard.38
By paper analysis, this system, if developed, will be a lightweight alternative that
will meet the FOR and revisit requirement. Still, there is no mention of how to overcome
the physical limitation on range as discussed above.
5.1.4. Modified Missile Detection Technology
The US Air Force Research Laboratory Sensors Directorate (AFRL/SN) is
addressing the see and avoid challenge with an initiative called the Air Traffic Detection
Sensor System (ATDSS). They have funded Defense Research Associates, Inc. (DRA),
to pursue a passive moving target detection system using low cost optical sensors,
processors, and DRA’s proprietary software originally developed for missile detection
systems. 39
No initial analysis is possible, but all the same inherent limitations make this a
technical high risk alternative.
5.1.5. Ranger Cameras
A similar system called Ranger was proposed at the AUVSI 04 conference. It
would use 4 cameras and an algorithm using image processing to detect traffic. No
further details are available.

5.2. Infrared
As shown in Figure 12, the infrared (IR) region is just lower in frequency (higher in
wavelength) than the visible spectrum. This technology takes advantage of the fact all
objects radiate energy at a quantity proportional to their temperature. Aircraft will have a
temperature contrast with the surrounding sky. Unless used with an IR illuminator, these
systems are passive; their detection is based on received energy only. IR systems are in
the electro-optical area of the spectrum and share many of the same properties and
limitations of systems in the visible range. They also have the physical limitations in the
presence of water vapor such as rain and fog, but not as significantly as visible imaging.
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A typical IR system requires a signal to clutter ratio greater than 19 in order to achieve a
99% probability of detection.40 Also, these systems must have target recognition
algorithms to analyze the information.
Though IR search and track (IRST) systems have been used by the military, there
are currently no IR DSA systems in use. The only known proposal is a NASA and US
Navy effort to develop a supplementary IR-based DSA system with a FOR of +/-105° in
azimuth and +/- 35° in elevation.41

5.3. Laser Radar
This technology operates in the visible and near-IR spectrum. A laser (light
amplification through stimulated emission of radiation) is a system capable of generating
an intense coherent beam of light. This beam is less susceptible to the atmospheric
attenuation of other electro-optical systems. When reflected this beam can be sensed by a
detector which can determine the distance of the reflected object. A laser detection and
ranging (LADAR) system takes advantage of this feature to make accurate range
measurements at long distances. Since the range is a part of each sensed beam, the
system is capable of providing a three dimensional perspective of the reflection. Some
sources also used the term light detection and ranging (LIDAR) and include the use of
ultraviolet lasers as well. Figure 14 shows the various lasers currently available and their
spectral positions.
The advantages and limitations of LADAR systems are both related to their very
precise focused beam. LADAR systems provide high resolution in range and angle, but
to cover a sufficient FOR they require very fast scanning, and real time signal processing.

Figure 14: L aser M ateria ls by Spectra l Position
(Source: N A W C W PN S H andbook TP 8347)
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5.3.1. LIDAR and Fish-eye Lenses
Engineering 2000 has proposed to use LADAR technology to detect obstacles
within a full 360 degree sphere. Their proposed system would first use what they call
fish-eye optics imaging systems to identify potential collision threats and then a LADAR
system to acquire range and closure rate. 42
There are no performance specifications to analyze with this system, but it appears
to take advantage of the strengths of the two technologies reviewed so far. That is, the
wide FOR of visual imaging systems with the precision of LADAR. This has the
possibility of achieving all performance goals while still being within limits of cost and
size for small UAVs. Though not yet mature, this option is recommended for further
investigation (See Section 6).
5.3.2. Strategic Defense Initiative Application
New Vistas International has proposed a system using radar and electrooptical/infrared sensors. The small gimbaled system leverages radar technology
developed in the strategic defense initiative program and later adapted for helicopter
obstacle avoidance systems made by Canada’s Amphitech International. 43
No initial analysis is possible; the biggest issue of doubt is how a system requiring
so much sensor equipment will be able to fit within the physical limitations of most
UAVs and small aircraft.

5.4. Passive MMW
Like IR systems, this technology takes advantage of the fact that all objects radiate
as a function of their temperature. As a passive system, it has the advantage of being low
power, but it suffers in range and accuracy performance. Most likely due to these
limitations, no known systems are being investigated to exploit this technology for the
purposes of DSA.

5.5. Radar
Radar (radio detection and ranging) systems have been used to detect aircraft for
decades. Their processing systems are very mature and their performance in all
conditions is very well known. Like LADAR, which was derived from radar principles,
it is an active system that sends strong pulses of energy and analyzes the returned signal.
Two locations of interest in the radar area of the spectrum are at 35 and 94 GHz.
The need for large external apertures makes radar systems difficult to implement on
small UAVs. Propeller driven aircraft have an even more difficult time dealing with the
interference issues that the propeller and engine can cause. Pusher propeller
configurations allow for the installation of radar in the nose, but the size, weight, and
power requirements make them still currently unfeasible.
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5.5.1. OASys Ka-band Radar
NASA´s optionally piloted aircraft, the Proteus, has performed tests with a 35 GHz
(Ka band) radar based DSA system developed by Amphitech. The OASys (Obstacle
Awareness System) radar detailed in Table 9, and shown in Figure 15, is mounted on the
chin of the Proteus. Designers set a range objective requirement of 6 NM. Initial NASA
tests found the system was capable of detection ranges between 2.5 to 6.5 nautical miles,
but there were some complete misses. The system is currently being redesigned by
Amphitech.
Based on NASA´s flight test results, this system comes close to meeting all
necessary performance requirements listed in Section 5. These are shown in Table 10.
Regarding physical characteristics, the total weight is about 55 pounds and the externally
mounted antenna is 16”x16”x22”. The system requires 250 W and costs $170,000. One
potentially critical problem is in the area of physical interference. Aircraft with forward
propellers will have a very difficult time finding a place to mount a complete radar and
gimbaled platform. This option is recommended for larger aircraft (Class II and III
UAVs) that can afford the cost and weight penalty and require the autonomous DSA
performance that this system offers (See Section 6).
5.5.2. Ultra-wideband Radar
Multispectral Solutions Inc. (MSSI) has engineered an ultra-wideband (UWB) radar
prototype. It is lightweight and employs standard, printed circuit board packaging, the
device radiates about 0.25 watt instantaneous peak power. The primary application for
this system is micro-UAVs whose main concerns are flying amongst trees and buildings
at very close range. This system is not capable of the ranges necessary for aircraft traffic
avoidance.

Table 9: Evaluation of OASys 35 GHz Radar
Parameter

System Performance

Generally sufficient for UAVs

Time to Collision based
on:
-- Detection Range &
2.5 –6.5 NM
-- Revisit Rate
150°/sec
Resolution e 1.7 mrad
Tracking Accuracy Range: <5 m
Field of Regard
Other

Notes

Typical: AZ: +/- 30°, EL: +/- 11°
Max: AZ: +/- 90°, EL: +25° & - 85°
Altitude limitation of 20k´
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Sufficient to achieve tracking within
warning time requirement
Sufficient to achieve tracking at
required range including worst case
scenario ambiguities.
Less than the ICAO requiremnet.
Problem for most UAVs

Figure 15: OASys Radar on Proteus
(Source: NASA website, Permission granted)

5.6. Off Board Assistance
Performing DSA through off board assistance is attractive for several reasons
including cost, weight penalty, and minimized integration issues. In this approach,
ground-based systems perform the detection operations. This information is then sent to
the aircraft by a data link system such as TIS-B discussed in Section 2.3. In areas where
ATS supports TIS-B, the traffic data can be received from the TIS-B system in the same
way as other aircraft. For areas of desired UAV operation that are not serviced by a TISB system, new systems would have to be installed.
This option exceeds all requirements, is very light, and relatively inexpensive.
These reasons make it seem perfect for the DSA function, except that is fails to meet the
primary assumption of see and avoid; that is, independence. Advocates of this option as
the sole means of DSA are facing a very challenging approval task because the
fundamental purpose of DSA in modern aviation is to be able to maintain safe operations
even when all outside systems fail. (See Section 6).
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6. UAV Type-Specific Recommendations
Given the complete requirements as listed above, and after a through examination
of the available technology, the following are recommended approaches for particular
UAV scenarios:
For small propeller-driven UAVs, there are currently no solutions that are fully
satisfactory. The most promising is the use of an off board system such as TIS-B
discussed in Section 2.3. This system is not fully proven, and has not been approved as a
primary DSA system. The obvious advantages, as discussed in Section 2.3.5, are low
size/weight and low cost. In addition, installation on existing UAVs will require much
less integration than other options. The US Navy is investigating this option. No
information is currently available regarding their plan on development. Test agencies in
Spain are lobbying their aviation authority for approval to use this option for both their
military and national police. If approved, this would at least allow the beginnings of
UAV operations in civil airspace while other technologies mature. The disadvantage of
this option is that it is not independent. This limits where a UAV could operate and
forces dependence on another organization. The Spanish have relatively few areas of
interest and many small UAVs. For a situation such as this, the expense and logistical
challenges of such construction will ultimately be less difficult than outfitting every UAV
with expensive and heavy equipment as is required for other options.
For aircraft that must have fully independent DSA, such as those used in tactical
military applications or to cover large distances, the best onboard alternative is a
combined visual and LADAR system as mentioned in Section 5.3.1. Such systems are
currently only in development, but they hold great promise. In addition to having the
possibility of meeting the evaluation requirements listed in this report, these systems
would have the military advantage of inherent low probability of interception (LPI).
At this time, radar systems such as the OASys are the most mature. For larger
UAVs tasked with strategic or high loiter missions, a radar system is a good selection.
The Spanish are looking into a multi-function radar option that could fulfill the tasks of
ground tracking, weather tracking, and DSA. The expense and weight of such systems is
still prohibitive for most classes of UAVs, but future developments promise to bring both
the price and the weight down.
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Conclusion
As it has been shown, UAVs bring the potential for enormous public benefit. The
market for their use in the plethora of possibilities is driving the revisions of all aspects of
aviation safety. Regulations will always lag behind what available technology makes
possible, but, as shown, their careful modification must be a part of any solution for safe
UAV operation in public skies. Also, developments in ATM such as ADS-B and TIS-B
come at a very good time for the UAV community.
The test and evaluation guidance given in this report is independent of the
technology being tested and can be used as a guide for all future DSA testing. That
section is very similar in format to typical avionics test plans, but the unique DSA
function requires the key differences. Unlike the timeless nature of the test guidance, the
recommendations section depicts the best options for the present time. The currently
available options leave much to be desired, but as these technologies mature they should
compare more favorably against the necessary requirements listed herein.
If the predictions of most aviation leaders come true, the next decade will see an
explosion in the number and variety of DSA systems. To prepare for this, regulatory
agencies must be knowledgeable of the necessary performance of these systems, and
UAV developers must be ready to quantitatively evaluate the options. This report aims to
have provided the necessary information for both.
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